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Abstract 
Entrepreneurs  cannot  develop  a  business  single  handedly.    One  of  the  most 
important tasks the entrepreneur faces is to recruit, allocate work to, motivate and 
retain employees who will help the business to grow.  Based on survey data, this 
paper  examines  the  HRM  orientations  of  UK  and  Japanese  high  tech 
manufacturing entrepreneurs, and identifies fundamentally different approaches 
to these tasks, at least as expressed by the entrepreneurs.  The UK entrepreneurs 
espouse an employment relationship based on ‘give and take’ flexibility, while the 
Japanese entrepreneurs are more focused on raising or nurturing their employees.  
Reasons  for  the  differences  are  explored,  and  relate  to  the  entrepreneurs’ 
backgrounds, as well as the business and social environment.  Implications for the 
‘new employment relationship’ are explored. 
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Introduction 
An entrepreneur cannot develop a business single handedly.  One of the most 
important tasks the entrepreneur faces is to recruit, allocate work to, motivate and 
retain employees who will help the business to grow.  This is no easy task.  Kets 
de Vries sums up the difficulty, at least from the perspective of the 1970s: 
What  we  frequently  encounter  in  an  entrepreneurial  organization  is  an 
organizational  structure  and  work  environment  completely  dependent  and 
totally dominated by the entrepreneur… We are also faced with an individual 
who refuses to delegate, is impulsive, lacks any interest in conscious, analytical 
forms of planning…’
1 
Stanworth and Curran (1989: 161) contend that this picture, which includes role 
ambiguity, role conflict and low levels of job satisfaction for employees, ‘has 
emerged from repeated studies of the small business and must now be regarded as 
approximating the most “typical” pattern.’  The pessimistic view of employment 
relations is well known, and will not be recounted here (cf. Rainnie, 1989).    
As  entrepreneurial  businesses  grow  –  in  order  for  them  to  grow  –  their 
employment practices become more formalized, standardized and systematic, and 
this is accompanied by decentralization of authority (e.g. Pugh et al., 1976; more 
recently Kotey and Slade, 2005; cf. also Flamholtz, 1995).  These practices may 
be accompanied by other ‘high commitment’ practices, such as single status, 
family friendly working arrangements, employee share ownership schemes and 
‘guaranteed’ job security, which are more prevalent in larger workplaces (Cully et 
al., 1999: 80-82).   
There are contrary views.  Hornsby and Kuratko studied a sample of 247 small 
businesses in the US Midwest and found that ‘the personnel practices of smaller 
firms  are  much  more  sophisticated  than  the  literature  leads  one  to  believe,’  
especially  in  manufacturing  (1990:  16).      Moreover  the  respondents  were 
concerned about the same issues, regardless of their size: ‘The highest ranked 
issues in all three size categories focus upon the need to obtain and retain a quality 
workforce’ (1990: 17).     2 
This observation raises an interesting set of questions which cannot simply be 
answered  by  quantitative  measures  of  formalization  or  high  commitment 
practices.  How do entrepreneurs believe they should go about obtaining and 
retaining a quality workforce?  What kinds of factors influence their beliefs?  
What are the consequences of their beliefs, for instance on their ability to grow 
and innovate?  These are questions addressed in this paper, through a comparison 
of Japanese and UK entrepreneurs and their small businesses engaged in high tech 
manufacturing.  If Hornsby and Kuratko are right about sophistication of practices 
in manufacturing, this is likely to be amplified in high tech manufacturing, where, 
in contrast to the low levels of education and managerial skills in the study by 
Kets de Vries, many entrepreneurs have high levels of education, and previous 
managerial experience.   
Baron et.al. have documented how models of employment relations espoused by 
founders  have  a  pervasive  effect  on  the  development  of  human  resource 
management  within  their  organizations.
2    They  develop  a  typology  of 
employment models – star, engineering, commitment and factory – which exhibit 
considerable internal consistency, and are particularly influenced by founders’ 
views  of  attachment  and  motivation.    Our  approach  is  reasonably  similar, 
although  it  was  developed  independently.    Like  Baron  et.al.,  moveover,  we 
explore  congruence  or  fit  with  the  external  social  environment  in  which  the 
businesses are situated, only in this case this means the UK and Japan. 
The motivation for this research came from detailed answers to a 1998 survey of 
small ‘high tech’ entrepreneurs in the UK.  In response to an open question (which 
did not ask specifically about HRM), there were numerous comments about the 
importance  of  people  management  and  creating  motivated  teams  to  meet 
customer needs in specialized niches.
3  The comments appeared to indicate an 
orientation which was different from that commonly found in traditional small 
firms, and from that of large firms.  In fact, some of the respondents suggested 
that their orientations were consciously formed as a reaction to past negative 
experiences, mostly in large firms.
4 
A  follow-up  survey  was  designed  to  gather  more  systematic  evidence  on  a 
number of issues raised by the first survey, including HRM orientations.  The 
survey, moreover, was replicated in Japan, as part of a comparative study of 
entrepreneurship.
5  To date, most comparative studies of employment relations   3 
have focused on large firms (cf. Dore’s [1973] classic UK-Japan comparison).  
Interest  in  the  relations  between  institutions  (‘types  of  capitalism’), 
entrepreneurship patterns and HRM is still in its infancy (Casper and Whitley, 
2002).  This study, while still exploratory, seeks to provide new insights through 
its  combination  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  methods.    The  following 
hypotheses are explored: 
Hypothesis 1 
The HRM orientations of UK entrepreneurs will be systematically different 
from those of Japanese entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 2 
These differences are in part attributable to differences in the environments in 
which the entrepreneurs operate (need for ‘fit’), and in part attributable to the 
entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and business orientations. 
Hypothesis 3 
HRM orientations in ‘high performing’ businesses in both countries will retain 
many of  these differences. 
 
Data 
The data comes from a) a questionnaire administered in the UK in December 
2000-January  2001  and  Japan  in  February-March  2002,  and  b)  in-depth 
interviews of 25 respondents in the UK carried out in 2001 and 25 respondents in 
Japan in 2004-05.  Details are given in the Appendix.  The questionnaire targeted 
CEOs of ‘high tech’ businesses, determined by activity (SIC code – cf. Butchart, 
1987; Hecker, 1999).  Respondents to the questionnaire were asked whether they 
would be willing to take part in a follow-up interview, and the 50 interviewees 
were selected from this group on a theoretical sampling basis (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998).    Criteria  for  selection  included  indications  of  innovative  activity, 
collaborative activity, geographic spread and sectoral balance.   In order to create 
a comparable data set from the questionnaire non-manufacturing, large and old 
businesses were excluded.  Some details of the entrepreneurs’ businesses are 
given in Table 1.   
   4 

















Before continuing, some clarification of our use of ‘entrepreneur’ is in order.  
Much early research sought to identify traits of entrepreneurs, or to distinguish 
entrepreneurs from other groups such as managers or traditional small business 
owners.  Gartner (1988), however, argued that ‘Who is an entrepreneur?’ is the 
wrong question.  For him, an entrepreneur is someone who creates organizations, 
and entrepreneurship is a set of activities involved in organization creation (also 
Gartner and Cater, 2005).   
Our research interest in HRM as outlined above fits broadly with this view.  We 
make one important qualification, however.  Comparative quantitative studies of 
entrepreneurship which use the criterion of starting a new business, notably the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, show Japan to have extremely low levels of 
entrepreneurship.
6  At the same time, Japan has an extremely high proportion of 
small  businesses  in  its  industrial  structure  (Whittaker,  1997).    This  apparent 
contradiction is seldom discussed, but is related to small business longevity – the 
high numbers of small businesses are a legacy of the 1950s and 1960s, when 
startup rates were high.   
 
 
 ‘High tech’ manufacturing, 1-199 employees, founded 1945→ → → →;  
UK n = 113; Japan n = 223; Total n = 336 
        UK (%)    Japan (%) 
Size        1-19employees    26.5    20.2   
       20-49     “    45.1    30.5 
       50-199   “    28.3    49.3 
Sector       Instruments    45.1    52.0 
       Computers, electronics  25.7    39.0 
       Other manufacturing  29.2      8.9 
Founding     1945-79    43.4    65.9 
       1980-89    28.3    21.5 
       1990-     28.3    12.6   5 
Existing  small  businesses,  we  contend,  can  and  do  provide  a  platform  for 
entrepreneurial  activities,  as  is  recognized  in  the  Japanese  term  ‘second 
founding.’  Many businesses grow spectacularly not under their founder, but 
under the second or subsequent generation of owner; Nintendo is a well-known 
example (it was founded in 1889).  In this study, therefore, we relax the condition 
of founder.  Instead, we restrict our sample to ‘high tech’ businesses, where some 
form of innovativeness can be expected if a business is to remain viable.
7  In the 
UK, 82% of our sample are founders, while in Japan the figures is half (49.8%  A 
further twenty nine percent are relatives of the founder, mostly sons.)  Relatedly, 
the Japanese businesses tend to be older (Table 1).  The case interviews, we feel, 
vindicate  our  decision  not  to  exclude  non-founders.    In  some  cases  the 
interviewee had taken over an ailing business and turned it into a completely new 
company.  In fact, it was not always clear-cut who should be considered the 
founder.   
Thus instead of creating a new business per se, therefore, our entrepreneurs carry 
out new economic activity or ‘new combinations’ in a Schumpeterian (2000) 
fashion.  Unlike Schumpeter, however, we do not necessarily see the entrepreneur 
as swimming against the stream  and facing social ostracism; our hypotheses 
assume some kind of fit with the environment, at least as far as HRM orientations 
go.  In addition, we select a group of ‘high performing’ businesses (which both 
grew and reported novel innovations in the past two years) and examine whether 
there are any special orientations on the part of these entrepreneurs. 
How to obtain and retain a quality workforce 
The questionnaire respondents were asked to rate ten items in response to the 
following question: ‘Some personnel policies are more important than others in 
recruiting and keeping good personnel.  How important are the following for 
you?’   A five point Likert scale was given, ranging from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘crucial’ 
(5).  The ten items listed assumed that the entrepreneurs had at least an implicit 
theory  of  motivation,  and  would  stress  either  intrinsic  or  job-related  items, 
extrinsic reward items, and/or supporting or environmental items.
8   6 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, rankings and significance levels 
of the means for the ten items for both the UK and Japanese sub-samples.  Before 
discussing them, we should note some caveats.  The table shows clearly the 
often-noted Japanese tendency to avoid extremes; while the UK means range 
from 1.92 to 4.06, the Japanese means range from 2.89 to 3.83, and with smaller 
standard  deviations.  On  seven  items,  too,  their  means  are  higher.    Second, 
‘providing incentives for individual excellence’ is poorly worded, as incentives 
can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary.  UK entrepreneurs might naturally opt for the 
former,  but  the  Japanese  translation  is  likely  to  have  nudged  the  Japanese 
respondents towards the latter.  Unfortunately neither of these points was picked 
up before the full surveys were carried out. 
With these cautions in mind, let us look at the results.  The rankings appear to 
suggest that financial incentives are given a low priority in both countries.  On this 
much there is broad agreement.
9  Yet not only are the means significantly different 
for all but 7) and 8), but a Spearman rank correlation test confirms that there is no 
correlation in the rankings (rho=.46 p=.18 n=10), indicating that the UK and 
Japanese respondents’ HRM orientations differ. 
 
Table 2:  HRM orientations of UK and Japanese entrepreneurs 
     
  UK      JAPAN       
HR Policy  Mean  SD  Rank  Mean  SD  Rank  SIG 
Paying top rates  3.17  .91  6  3.43  .85  6  .01 
Giving challenging job assignments  3.58  .83  2  3.82  .85  2  .05 
Providing/facilitating training and 
education 
3.08  .88  8  3.58  .78  4  .01 
Providing a stable and supportive 
work environment 
4.06  .79  1  3.54  .77  5  .01 
Offering flexible/family friendly 
work arrangements 
3.54  1.11  3  3.17  .81  9  .01 
Providing incentives for individual 
excellence 
3.27  1.03  5  3.83  .71  1  .01 
Providing a good welfare and fringe 
benefit package 
2.97  1.03  9  2.89  .83  10  NS 
Providing an attractive physical 
working environment 
3.15  1.01  7  3.28  .78  7  NS 
Giving employees a financial stake 
in the company 
1.92  1.07  10  3.20  .95  8  .01 
Encouraging autonomy in decision 
making 
3.36  .96  4  3.76  .80  3  .01 
 
   7 
This provides support for Hypothesis 1.  To explore it further, we subjected the 
responses to a factor analysis (initial principal component using varimax rotation).  
As far as the overall sample went, this revealed two factors, explaining 43.2 
percent of the total variance.  The first factor (explaining 23.75 percent of the 
variance) was labeled ‘individual’ as the orientations reflected considerations 
towards individuals.  The second factor (explaining 19.27 percent of the variance) 
was labeled ‘environment’ as the items reflected organizational/environmental 
considerations.  Table 3 presents the results. 
To further confirm whether the orientations of the Japanese entrepreneurs differed 
from the UK entrepreneurs, a discriminant function analysis was performed based 
on the two factors.  Table 4 presents the standardized coefficients. Seventy five 
percent  of  the  subjects  were  correctly  classified.    Both  factors  significantly 
differentiate  between  the  Japanese  and  UK  entrepreneurs,  but  the  individual 
factor  is  the  stronger  discriminator  (Wilks  lambda=.804,  F(1,320)=78.11, 
p<.0001  )  compared  to  the  organizational  environment  factor  (Wilks 
lambda=.750,  F(1,321)=53.21, p<.0001 ).   
   8 
Table 3: Principal component analysis for the total sample 
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Table 4: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients 
   Function 
   1 
HRM ORIENTATIONS INDIVIDUAL  .993 
HRM ORIENTATIONS ENVIRONMENT  -.536 
 
   9 
The fact that the correlation of the ranking among the ten HRM orientation items 
was  not  significant,  and  differences  of  the  means  of  eight  were  statistically 
significant, suggests that Japanese entrepreneurs not only differ from their UK 
counterparts, but they may view the relationships among the items differently as 
well.  To explore this possibility separate factor analyses were conducted on the 
Japanese and UK sub-samples.  Tables 5 and 6 present the results. 
 
Table 5: Principal component analysis for the UK sample 
 
 UK SAMPLE   
 HRM orientations (item rank)  ORG CLIM  OWNERSHIP 
UK-RECOG- 
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Table 6: Principal component analysis for the Japanese sample 
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Giving challenging job assignments (2) 
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Cumulative variance % 































The factor analysis for the UK sub-sample revealed three factors, explaining 
49.11 percent of the total variance.  The first factor, explaining 19.12 percent of 
the variance, is identical to the organizational/environment factor in the total 
sample.  The individual factor of the total sample breaks into two factors.  One of 
these, explaining 15.8 percent of the variance, was labeled ‘ownership.’  Two of 
the variables relate to jobs, and might be seen as ‘job ownership.’  Another 
possible interpretation of the variable is ‘opportunity’.  The third factor appears to 
be a rather complex mixture, but appears to relate to ‘recognition’ of individual 
employees. (This is different from ‘recognition’ in the Japanese sample, hence we 
use the prefixes UK and J respectively.  In one sense this is confusing, but we feel   11 
the nuances of the factors in their specific contexts are conveyed in this way.) 
Factor analysis of the Japanese sample revealed four factors, explaining 65.82 
percent of the total variance.  Again the individual factor of the total sample split 
into two, but so did the organizational climate factor.  In the Japanese sample, the 
first factor, explaining 21.39 percent of the variance, is a complex mixture of four 
items relating to how the individual works, is trained and comes to identify with 
the company.  After a close analysis of the Japanese case interviews, discussed 
below, we have called it ‘growth,’ but in fact the Japanese expression ‘ikusei’ or 
‘raising/nurturing’ is probably closer to the mark.  The second and third factors, 
explaining, 16.47 and 15.17 percent respectively, represent the organizational 
climate  or  environment  factor.    Japanese  entrepreneurs  seem  to  distinguish 
between items which might enable employees to work with ‘peace of mind’ – 
‘background’  items  for  them,  but  ranked  extremely  highly  by  the  UK 
entrepreneurs (third and first, respectively) –  and more tangible or visible items 
of physical working environment and fringe benefit package, which both groups 
assigned low priority to.  The  fourth factor,  explaining 12.79 percent of the 
variance,  is  labeled  ‘J-recognition’,  and  it  is  somewhat  different  than  the 
‘recognition’ factor of the UK. 
The  underlying  factor  structure  between  entrepreneurs’  HRM  orientations  in 
Japan and the UK are primarily different when it comes to the ‘individual’ factors, 
but the item ranks suggest the factors are also given different weightings. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of HRM orientation factors in the UK and Japan 
 

















Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic representation of the underlying structure in 
both samples.  Note that the organizational climate factor in the UK contains two   12
of the top-ranked items, and appears to feature more prominently in the minds of 
the UK entrepreneurs than the two organizational climate factors in Japan.  Note, 
too,  that  the  two  individual  factors  are  somewhat  different  between  the  two 
countries.  These differences cannot be interpreted from the data alone.  To do this 
we turn to the case interviews.   
 
Interpretation through case interviews 
Clearly there are differences between the UK and Japanese entrepreneurs in terms 
of HRM orientations.  Further tests reveal that these are not the result of size or 
sectoral differences.  The differences need further interpretation and explanation.  
To do this, we turn to our case interviews of 25 entrepreneurs in both the UK and 
Japan, conducted between 2001 and 2005 (see the Appendix for details).  Here we 
stress differences between the UK and Japanese entrepreneurs, although there 
were of course differences within these groups as well. 
Flexibility and family friendliness 
In  terms  of  discourse,  the  first  notable  difference  between  the  UK  and  the 
Japanese  interviews  was  how  much  more  prominently  employee  and  HRM 
matters  featured  in  the  former.    It  was  clear  that  for  the  UK  entrepreneurs, 
managing employees effectively was crucial to the delivery of their products or 
services, and they spent quite a lot of time thinking about it and worrying about it.  
In this, they did not fit the image of the entrepreneur depicted by Kets de Vries.  
Many of the Japanese entrepreneurs, on the other hand, appeared closer to that 
image, at least superficially.  The focus of their discourse was very much on the 
product or service, and while they might have spent time thinking and worrying 
about employee management, it did not figure in their accounts nearly as much, 
and when it did, it figured differently. 
Both groups seemed to be looking for broadly similar employees.  Fit with the 
organization culture was crucial.  This meant hiring people with a ‘positive’ 
attitude, people who were not nine-to-five clock watchers.  They were looking for 
people  enthusiastic  about  work,  willing  to  learn,  willing  to  take  initiative.  
Subsequently, however, their paths diverged. 
The UK entrepreneurs sought to recruit the above people, and to integrate them   13
into  a  team  of  like-minded  employees,  creating  a  strong  esprit  de  corps.  
Employees sometimes had to go the extra mile, to spend long hours working 
before a deadline, for instance.  Willingness to do this could not be taken for 
granted.  It had to be voluntarily offered.  To ensure that this discretionary effort 
was forthcoming, a tradeoff made was in terms of flexibility.  In return for such 
discretionary effort, which could be expected to have a negative impact on the 
employee’s private life, flexibility was offered.  The employee could take time off 
to see to events at his/her daughter’s school.  There was give and take on the issue, 
as long as there was not an imbalance towards the take.
10  This helps to explain the 
importance  of  flexible,  family-friendly  work  arrangements  for  the  UK 
entrepreneurs.  The following quotes illustrate this, their link to a ‘stable and 
supportive work environment,’ and indeed concern for supportive family relations  
‘We have an employee who has been with us 12 years.  Last week he was on 
holiday in America, but every day he was on the phone, asking his people, 
following them up.  It’s that culture – we work hard, we play hard and we want 
to be profitable…  And finally, success is when I see my people happy, when on 
a Friday night at 6 or 7 o’clock there are still people were saying sorry we really 
can’t go, we’ve just got to get this done.  That is success because people aren’t 
going to be here on Friday night if they aren’t committed.’ 
‘I take an interest in their lives and they respond by doing the same with me and 
the company… You know, it’s a serious employee, has been here a long time, 
done a good job, has a problem – they get paid, you know, whatever their 
condition is and exceptional absences from work…’ 
‘These guys are the A team.  They will stick with me through thick and thin.  We 
work as a team.  Nobody says that’s not my job, or I’m too busy with my job to 
help you with yours… Immense flexibility.  If you want to go four hours early 
today that’s no problem, so long as it’s not happening constantly.  No recording, 
no clocking in and out… Also we often need to meet a deadline, say for a large 
order for Australia.  We’ve had them working all night, have worked through till 
four in the morning, then I will go out and get a big pile of pizzas and a crate of 
beer.’ 
‘We know everyone’s family, and we network and have events like picnics, 
evenings  out  with  families.    Whatever  this  company  does  in  terms  of   14
entertainment, we always involve families… We have some very dedicated 
people and it’s to thank them for allowing their husband or wife to work so 
hard.’ 
The Japanese entrepreneurs, on the other hand, needed to make no such tradeoff.  
They wanted to recruit similar people, and they had the same needs as far as 
Friday evening or weekend work went.  But this was expected of their employees.  
What they were expected to offer their employees in return – and their families 
–was first and foremost stable employment, which they largely saw in terms of 
personal responsibility rather than HRM orientation, and then average or better 
wages and conditions and opportunities for growth through work – incentives for 
individual excellence and challenging job assignments. 
To some extent, of course, this reflects the different labour market conditions in 
both countries.  Greater fluidity in the UK presumably presses entrepreneurs to be 
sensitive to employee needs for flexibility.  But it is more than that.  It reflects 
different social or family relationships as well.  The UK employee could not be 
expected to give all when this created family tensions.  The potential for family 
tensions was considerable, judging from the complicated family arrangements 
recounted by some of the entrepreneurs.  This explains their attempts to create 
goodwill in the families themselves though family events.  In effect, employees’ 
families were part of the implicit contract.  There had to be give and take for them 
as well.   
The Japanese entrepreneurs, however, could more easily assume acquiescence on 
the part of their employees’ families.  Certainly they knew about their employees’ 
families, and sometimes if there were tensions at home, but offering flexibility to 
deal with it happened at the margins.  ‘Mature’ employees would not only go the 
extra mile for the development of the company, which would benefit everyone 
including themselves, but in doing so should not let family matters impinge on 
their work. 
 
In brief, the comparison highlights a neglected dimension of environmental ‘fit.’  
It is not just the competitive environment that the entrepreneurs must be mindful 
of,  or  even  the  institutional  (labour  market)  environment,  but  the  social 
environment as well.  This impacts on the company most visibly through the   15
employment relationship.  The UK entrepreneurs were well aware of this need for 
fit  from  their  own  family  lives,  moreover.    The  stability  in  their  social 
environment, on the other hand, allowed the Japanese entrepreneurs to take this 
for granted, and to interpret individual dedication to the company in terms of 
individual commitment and maturity.  Quite a few of the Japanese entrepreneurs, 
in fact, prided themselves on the fact that they worked harder and longer hours 
than anyone else; hardly grounds for sympathy in terms of family-work balance 
from their employees, even if it was sought.  
 
Specialization and delegation 
A second set of observations also calls for qualifications to the autocratic/chaotic 
entrepreneur  picture,  again  with  divergence  on  the  part  of  the  British 
entrepreneurs.  It also calls for caution if not qualification to the many studies 
which see HRM practices in entrepreneurial businesses as emerging gradually 
from  a  state  of  chaos  and  high  informality  towards  greater  formalization, 
specialization and systematization, accompanied by delegation as the company 
grows.  In a very general sense, this may happen, but a comparison reveals 
significant differences related to the backgrounds of the entrepreneurs, how they 
start their business, and how they grow it. 
Many  of  the  UK  entrepreneurs  started  their  business  with  a  small  team  of 
colleagues from a former business.  From the inception, there was a specialization, 
and while there was a CEO, his role appeared to be more like a team leader than 
someone  with  absolute  authority.    This  was  reinforced by  a  sense  of  shared 
enthusiasm and partnership in a new adventure at the time of founding.  It seems 
that this ethos and division of labour more easily leads to a division of labour and 
delegation when employees are recruited.  Moreover, the backgrounds of many of 
the entrepreneurs, especially experience in a variety of companies and in a variety 
of management positions, also seemed to facilitate early delegation and a division 
of labour. 
Many of the recruits were highly qualified and expected to have challenging work 
delegated to them from an early stage, moreover.
11  If they weren’t promised it, 
they wouldn’t join the company, and if they didn’t get it, they would quit.  High 
levels of qualifications seemed to enhance collegiality and delegation.  In this   16
environment, the entrepreneur was like a conductor. 
In Japan, however, there was a different set of dynamics.  Quite a few of the 
entrepreneurs  had  felt  frustrated  at  aspects  of  HRM  at  their  previous  large 
company – seniority in promotions and work assignments, lack of opportunities 
to develop individual creativity, and so on – which instilled a desire to give their 
employees  opportunities  for  individual  excellence  and  challenging  job 
assignments.   
‘Old  established  companies  like  M  have  lots  of  graduates  from  the  top 
universities.  I was not one of them, so even though I had the most patents, they 
were reluctant to take up my ideas.  From that, I felt the importance of individual 
creativity, bringing it out and applying it.  I try not to impose my ideas on others, 
but to encourage them to come up with suggestions, and to experience the joy of 
inventing.’ 
‘I was quick in doing my work, but the others did a lot of overtime.  I was seen 
as half-hearted, and they were seen as loyal.  I didn’t think rewards should be 
based on time worked.  And the differences were so small – just a few thousand 
yen after several years.  I believe pay should be based on performance, not on 
years of experience, education or gender.’ 
These convictions, on the other hand, were tempered in practice by pressing 
business  needs,  which  the  president  felt  acutely,  but  thought  that  not  all 
employees did likewise.  He did not see himself as a conductor so much as a 
locomotive, pulling along a train which frequently threatened to go off the rails.  
Often he had started the business by himself, or with a ‘right hand’ man, but the 
locus of authority was clear and undisputed.
12  His years of work in R&D in a 
large company, or R&D and sales, and his focus on technology as the core of the 
business,  both  gave  him  confidence  that  he  knew  best  how  to  develop  the 
company, and put pressure on him to maintain control of many activities as well.  
This made it difficult to delegate, especially when there was still a risk of staff 
turnover.  The fact that he relied on a small number of clients initially, who he 
alone had personal relations with, further reinforced this tendency.   
There  was  often  a  difficulty  in  recruiting  (and  retaining  –  large  companies 
poached good engineers) employees of the calibre seen necessary, and hence 
these raw recruits required ‘raising.’  Even if postgraduates with high technical   17
skills could be recruited, moreover, there was still a tendency to see them as apt to 
allow technology fascination to over-rise commercial sense.  Mid-career hires, 
too, needed to be integrated into the corporate culture, which took time. 
‘Work has to be enjoyable, but it also has to make money.  It shouldn’t just be 
enjoyable by yourself, but for those around, and customers.’ 
‘For the first 10 years I had to do everything – lay the rails to go on…  Japanese 
school education nowadays is very problematic.  It promotes a funny kind of 
egalitarianism – no losers.  But in business there are only gold medals – nothing 
else.  You either get the order or you don’t.  This year’s keyword is “tatakai” 
(fight).  It’s in the notebook, look.  I check how each of my employees are doing 
– 30 minutes each per month.  The critical thing is to get values aligned. ’ 
Thus the early years were spent with the president and perhaps a ‘right hand man’ 
battling to establish the business, and the next years when employees were hired 
to ‘raising them’ to create a viable company core.  This might involve providing 
incentives for individual excellence, challenging job assignments and autonomy, 
but  the  autonomy  was  in  fact  within  prescribed  bounds,  and  only  gradually 
increased.  The president was still firmly in control (and not initially interested in 
relinquishing it).  In fact, two or three of the entrepreneurs indicated that their 
preferred company size was 30 employees.  ‘This is because I can still oversee 
everything.  If it grows bigger than that, the best idea would probably be to spin 
out another company.’
13 It was only when the company got to have about 60 
employees  that  the  president  started  thinking  seriously  about  systematic 
organization  and  delegation.    In  some  cases,  at  that  point  the  company  had 
established a strong competitive base, and was poised for substantial growth.  The 
‘raising’ had been accomplished, potential leaders identified, values aligned and 
employees  were  ready  for  new  challenges  through  product  diversification.  
Challenging job assignments and autonomy took on a more substantial meaning 
at this stage. 
Training and education 
As this brief account suggests, the Japanese cases were closer to the orthodox 
view of the evolution of HRM practices, sometimes in slow motion.  A third 
observation relates to contrasting notions of education and training.  The British 
entrepreneurs were more likely to see their employees as independent actors, and   18
to take for granted on-job training in their accounts (which is not to say some did 
not happen).  They encouraged their employees to go on courses, however, and 
sometimes set aside a fixed portion of turnover, or established target hours for 
them to do this, hoping that they would gain new insights and motivation, and that 
they would diffuse the knowledge in the company.   
Some  Japanese  entrepreneurs  encouraged  their  employees  to  go  on  external 
courses, too, but in most instances, an emphasis was placed on on-job training.  
This is hardly surprising, since the entrepreneur was the locomotive, and the 
direction of knowledge or skill transfer was from him.  ‘Raising’ employees 
through OJT, moreover, was not just about skills, but about acculturation, which 
was seen to take place slowly.
14  In this sense, the meaning of education and 
training was very different.   
While the qualitative differences were striking, it is unclear to what extent there 
were  quantitative  differences,  as  training  and  education  costs  are  difficult  to 
calculate.  In terms of itemized, budgeted expenditure, it seems as if the UK 
entrepreneurs spent more, given the extent of external courses.  This contradicts 
functionalist theories of human capital which hold that employers are reluctant to 
invest if they cannot be certain of recouping their investments (i.e., where external 
labour  markets  are  developed).    The  interviews  suggest  that  training  and 
education considerations are part of more complex calculations which differ in 
the two countries, involving autonomy and motivation and the implicit contract of 
the employment relationship in the UK, and ‘raising’ employees gradually or at 






Further evidence to support these arguments comes from a question on company 
culture in the questionnaire survey.  Respondents were asked: ‘How strongly do 
you agree with the following general statements about your business?’  Again a   19
five point Likert scale was used, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly 
agree’ (5).  The results are given in Table 7.  The contrast between the means of 
‘My business is a personal place; it’s like an extended family’ signals its positive 
meaning  for  the  UK  entrepreneurs,  and  its  negative  meaning  for  Japanese 
entrepreneurs.  This negative reaction has been intensified by long years of small 
firm advisors and commentators who condemn Japanese small firm owners for 
mixing  family  and  business,  and  the  association  of  family-like  business  as 
backward. 
 
Table 7        Company culture 
 
  UK      JAPAN       
  Mean  SD  Rank  Mean  SD  Rank  SIG 
My business is a personal 
place; it is like an extended 
family 
3.96  .86  2  2.11  1.05  5  .01 
Employment is competitive; 
measurable goals are 
important 
3.59  .89  5  4.26  .75  1  .01 
There are clear rules which 
employees are expected to 
follow 
3.70  .84  3  3.76  .72  3  NS 
People here are able to make 
decisions autonomously 
3.68  .80  4  3.51  .84  4  NS 
Team work and joint 
problem solving are 
encouraged here 
4.42  .56  1  3.78  .75  2  .01 
 
Teamwork and joint problem solving were ranked highly by both groups, but in 
the UK this meant teamwork with specialization and to some extent devolved 
authority  (ideally,  at  least),  while  in  Japan  it  meant  teamwork  in  the  sense 
commonly used for quality circles, within bounds.  These bounds were set out in 
‘measurable  goals’  most  strongly  supported  by  Japanese  entrepreneurs.    We 
interpret this as trying to keep employees on their toes, and ‘raising’ them by 
establishing tangible goals to work towards. 
 
The ‘high performers’ 
Finally, do the differences between the two countries that we have outlined so far 
also apply to ‘high performers’?  Is there a set of orientations associated with high   20
performance which might suggest ‘best practice’ regardless of country, or is ‘best 
practice’ context-dependent, dependent on ‘fit’?  To address this question we 
looked at self-reported figures on turnover and innovation in the past two years.
15  
Our  ‘high  performance’  indicator  requires  both  turnover  growth  and  novel 
innovation (new to both company and industry).  Interestingly, thirty five percent 
of both the UK and Japanese samples qualified, reducing the UK sample to 40 and 
the Japanese sample to 78.
16 
As with the total sample, we carried out a Student t-test on each of the HRM 
orientations.  The results are given in Table 8.  Comparing this table with Table 2, 
we  see  that  the  basic  scores  and  rankings  are  similar.    For  the  UK  sample, 
however,  offering  flexible/family  friendly  work  arrangements  becomes  even 
more  important  (rank  3  to  second  equal),  as  do  training  and  education  and 
physical work environment (moving from seventh and eighth respectively to sixth 
equal).  The tendencies noted for the total UK sample, therefore, appear even 
stronger. 
For the Japanese high performers the order of the first and second-ranked items 
are reversed, although the original difference was tiny.  Likewise the order of the 
fifth and sixth-ranked variables are reversed, as are the seventh and eight-ranked 
variables.  The result is that the variables of the two ‘individual’ factors – growth 
and stretch – are given somewhat more priority, and organization/environment 
variables are given somewhat less.  Thus the overall effect, if anything, is to 
heighten the contrast between the UK and Japanese entrepreneurs in terms of 
HRM orientations. 
   21
Table 8  'High performers’ compared (UK n=40; Japan n=78) 
 
  UK      JAPAN       
HR Policy  Mean  SD  Rank  Mean  SD  Rank  SIG 
Paying top rates  3.20  .79  6  3.58  .78  5  .05 
Giving challenging job assignments  3.73  .85  2  3.99  .88  1  NS 
Providing/facilitating training and 
education 
3.20  .94  6  3.65  .74  4  .01 
Providing a stable and supportive 
work environment 
4.25  .63  1  3.52  .77  6  .01 
Offering flexible/family friendly 
work arrangements 
3.73  1.09  2  3.19  .84  9  .01 
Providing incentives for individual 
excellence 
3.25  1.03  5  3.93  .70  2  .01 
Providing a good welfare and fringe 
benefit package 
3.05  1.18  9  2.88  .73  10  NS 
Providing an attractive physical work 
environment 
3.20  .91  6  3.32  .72  8  NS 
Giving employees a financial stake 
in the company 
1.83  .96  10  3.36  .93  7  .01 
Encouraging autonomy in decision 
making 
3.68  1.02  4  3.77  .84  3  NS 
 
 
The decreased sample size prevents us from repeating the factor analysis exercise, 
but it is unlikely that the structures would change significantly.  Spearman’s rank 
correlation  again  shows  a  non-significant  correlation  between  the  countries 
(rho=.46 p=.18 n=10).    We should add, too, that the company culture rankings 
remain unchanged for the high performers.   
 
Concluding discussion: A new employment relationship? 
We return to the three hypotheses: 
1  The HRM orientations of UK entrepreneurs will be systematically different 
from those of Japanese entrepreneurs. 
2  These differences are in part attributable to differences in the environments in 
which the entrepreneurs operate (need for ‘fit’), and in part attributable to the 
entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and business orientations. 
3   HRM orientations in ‘high performing’ businesses in both countries will retain 
many of these differences.   22
Our answers to the hypotheses are all affirmative, but the differences were not 
those  we  expected.    We  had  expected  different  weightings  on  extrinsic  and 
intrinsic motivation orientations, as well as environmental factors, perhaps with 
the UK entrepreneurs scoring higher on extrinsic motivation orientations, and 
Japanese entrepreneurs giving more weight to the environmental factors.  We 
never expected extrinsic motivation orientations to be rated quite so low, or the 
environmental factors to be rated to highly by the UK entrepreneurs, or so lowly 
by the Japanese entrepreneurs.  In order to explain this puzzle, we turned to our 
case interviews, and discovered plausible explanations, and that the same variable 
sometimes took on a very different meaning through its relationship with other 
variables, and in a different social context.  These meanings cannot be discovered 
through regular survey tick-box methods.   
In our concluding comments we would like to draw out the implications of our 
findings for the debates on the ‘new employment relationship,’ and outline how 
we might develop this research. 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  growth  in  attempts  to  portray  the  ‘new 
employment relationship’ which has emerged in the aftermath of restructuring in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
17  Such writings often argue that the old ‘psychological 
contract’ or exchange of loyalty for job security has been abandoned as market 
forces have penetrated the employment relation, placing much of the burden of 
flexibility  on  employees.    This  gives  rise  to  a  contradiction;  employees  are 
required to offer more for less – higher discretionary commitment in exchange for 
insecurity  and  stress.  The  contradiction  is  presumably  managed  by  high 
commitment ‘fudges’ or by pecuniary mechanisms.  
Our  findings  suggest  that  high  tech  entrepreneurs  in  the  UK  are  seeking  to 
construct a new psychological contract, by trying to make the workplace more 
personal  and responsive to employee  needs, to  secure high commitment  and 
discretionary effort.  This implicit contract is most noticeable in businesses with 
highly educated workforces, even very small ones.  And these businesses tend to 
be ‘high performing’ in the sense we have used it here.  If ‘communities of 
loyalty’ have given way to ‘communities of purpose’ (Heckscher, 1995), it is this 
exchange which underlies the latter.  UK entrepreneurs do not prioritize financial 
rewards.   23
Indeed,  ‘communities  of  purpose’  might  be  a  good  way  to  describe  these 
businesses given that the entrepreneurs seek to establish internal trust relations 
through this exchange which can then be applied to relations with customers.  
Relative homogeneity in terms of education levels facilitates this, as does that fact 
that most of these businesses are not engaged in routine or volume manufacturing.  
It was notable that in businesses where entrepreneurs expressed what might be 
considered ‘traditional’ attitudes towards the employment relationship – emphasis 
on  control,  and  concerns  about  trust  or  employee  willingness  to  exert 
discretionary effort (on a generalized rather than individual basis) – were often 
businesses which included rather traditional manufacturing operations.
18 
In Japan, there appears to be greater continuity with small firms of the industrial 
era  (cf.  Whittaker,  1997),  which  is  not  surprising  given  that  Japan’s 
post-industrial transition (in the sense of declining employment in manufacturing) 
started in the early 1990s, and although there was a wave of restructuring in the 
late 1990s-early 2000s, it was more muted than in the UK in the 1980s.  Most 
Japanese  businesses  studied  here  were  founded  before  this  restructuring.  
Japanese entrepreneurs did appear to be adapting to their changing environment 
in their quest to secure and retain quality employees by offering challenging job 
assignments,  incentives  for  individual  excellence,  and  autonomy  in  decision 
making earlier than they might have in the past.  But their social environment was 
still more stable, and they do not appear to have fundamentally altered the basis of 
the employment relationship or effort-reward exchange.  It may well be that had 
we obtained data for high tech non-manufacturing businesses in Japan, more 
recently founded than the manufacturers in our survey, the differences with the 
UK businesses would have been smaller.  Unfortunately, we do not have this data. 
We have explored only a small part of our data, both on HRM orientations and 
practices,  and  their  relations  with  wider  aspects  of  entrepreneurship  such  as 
entrepreneurs’ business orientations and competitive advantages.  This will be our 
next task.  There is a need for exploratory research such as this, we believe, before 
we embark on an even more ambitious project on comparative entrepreneurship.  
Ideally, however, we would work with a bigger data set, which encompasses 
non-manufacturing high tech activities, and more countries.   24
Notes: 
 
1  Kets de Vries, 1977: 63; cited in Stanworth and Curran, 1989: 160. 
2  Baron, Burton and Hannan, 1996; Hannan, Burton and Baron, 1996. 
3  The open question asked: ‘In the space below, please recall any critical events or 
experiences  which  influenced  a)  your  approach  to  business,  and  b)  the 
development of your business.’  Comments like the following were common: 
‘Allow people the freedom to use their own creativity for the good of the company.  
Keep the family atmosphere as far as possible.  Delegate and allow people the 
freedom to make mistakes.’  ‘To provide good quality products and service to 
customers with appropriate rewards to all our staff… Pay staff as much as can be 
afforded  rather  than  as  little  as  one  can  “get  away  with”.’    ‘To  harness  the 
expertise of our team to work in partnership with our clients to provide customers 
high quality solutions.  To ensure that every employee is valued as a real business 
asset...’ 
4  ‘When I was an employee, I saw continual Customer dissatisfaction caused by 
co-workers who lacked Technical Expertise, and pressure to achieve Unrealistic 
Objectives,’ and so on.   
5  See the Appendix for further details of the study, as well as the definition of 
‘high tech’. 
6  www.genconsortium.org 
7  In other words, we incorporate the concept of entrepreneurship as emergent 
activity,  or  the  discovery  and  exploitation  of  opportunities  (Shane  and 
Venkataraman,  2000).    Davidsson  et.al.  comment  on  this  distinction:  ‘There 
seems  to  be  a  movement  towards  consensus  that  entrepreneurship  is  about 
emergence’ and argue that ‘studies that seek to measure a nation’s entrepreneurial 
behaviour through the creation of new firms or the intention to create a new 
independent business may understate the true extent of entrepreneurship’ (2001: 
13, 10). 
8  This is similar to Baron et.al.’s (1996) ‘work’, ‘money’ and ‘love’, although 
love  is  somewhat  different  ,  and  our  job  items  incorporate  their  (separate) 
‘control’ variable. 
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9  Not only do they rank low in the UK, but they are not correlated with other 
items.    In  Japan  correlations  are  more  extensive,  suggesting  greater 
comprehensiveness  in  HRM  orientations.    Correlograms  (not presented  here) 
show this visually. 
10   We  might  add  that  employees  who  did  not  achieve  ‘fit’  with  what  the 
entrepreneur was seeking – who were seen as taking more than they were giving – 
were ‘let go.’   
11  In the original sub-samples, 6.2% (13.4%) of the UK (Japanese) entrepreneurs 
reported that 50% or more of their employees were university graduates, 42.0% 
(59.8%) that 10% or more were graduates, and 22.3% (18%) that none were 
graduates.  For the case companies, the respective figures were 32.0% (50.0%), 
80.0% (71.4%) and 8.0% (23.8%).  The UK case figures included a significant 
number of Ph.Ds. 
12  Evidence here is again based on interviews.  We are unable to show this 
statistically,  as  we  are  not  confident  that  our  data  distinguishes  adequately 
between active and sleeping partners, especially in Japan. 
13  Twenty employees is often cited as a cut-off or plateau figure form many (UK) 
businesses as it is at this stage that the limits of informality become apparent: 
Roberts et.al., 1992; 255. 
14  For UK entrepreneurs, moreover, acculturation or fit was achieved through the 
head, perceptually, rather than gradually through the head via the body, so to 
speak. 
15 Respondents were asked: ‘Over the past two years, what has happened to your 
turnover?  (stayed the same; increased, by _ %; decreased by_%).  The question 
on innovation is compatible with the Oslo Manual indicators, and is used by the 
Centre for Business Research, Cambridge.  Entrepreneurs were asked if they had 
introduced in the past two years innovations (product, process, logistics, service, 
means of delivering product or service) in the past two years which were a) new to 
their business but not their industry, or b) new to their business as well as their 
industry. 
16  57.5% (48.4%) of the UK (Japanese) entrepreneurs reported increased turnover 
in the past two years; 59.2% (64.1%) of UK (Japanese) entrepreneurs reported 
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novel innovations (new to their company and industry).   As we do not have panel 
data on these indicators, our conclusions must be tentative. 
17  See for instance, Kanter, 1993; Heckscher, 1995, Cappelli et al., 1997, Blair 
and Kochan eds, 2000, for the US.  The extent of change in the US has been 
disputed; see for instance the exchange between Cappelli and Jacoby, 1999.  On 
the ‘high commitment’ workplace, see for instance Applebaum and Batt (1994). 
18  These observations are tentative; more research needs to be done in this area.  
 
Annotation: 
1) ‘High tech’: The definition of ‘high tech’ derives from Butchart (1987), which 
identifies four digit SIC industries based on R&D intensity, and the proportion of 
scientists, professional engineers and technicians in the workforce.  These were 
modified in the light of Hecker (1999) to give a more up to date classification, and 
to  facilitate  comparison  between  the  UK  and  Japan.    (See  Whittaker,  1999; 
Quince and Whittaker, 2002). 
2) ‘Venture’ in the Japanese surveys refers to businesses identified as: founded 
since 1965 (not rigorously enforced), with innovative management, a recognized 
position in their market or industry, evidence of entrepreneurship and without 
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The initial Japanese survey was carried out by Momose and Morishita in 1996, 
and published in 1997 (see figure).  Entrepreneurs/businesses were selected from 
the  1996  nen  ban  Nikkei  bencha  bijinesu  nenkan    (Nikkei  Entrepreneurial 
Business Annual, 1996), and Toyo keizai’s Kaisha shikiho jojo, tento kaisha 
ban ’96 (Company Quarterly Listed and Over-the-Counter Companies 1996) and 
Kaisha shikiho mijojo kaisha ban ’96 (Company Quarterly Unlisted Company 
Edition 1996).  The questionnaire was constructed without a view to international 
comparisons.   
Difficulties in identifying a matching sample in the UK led to a decision to focus 
on CEOs of businesses in ‘high tech’ industries, as viability in these industries 
was likely to necessitate entrepreneurial behaviour.  The sample was based on 
single site, independent businesses listed on the Dun and Bradstreet data base in 
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January, 1998.  The questionnaire was modified in the light of findings from 
Momose  and  Morishita  (1997),  and  to  ensure  questions  were  relevant  and 
meaningful to UK entrepreneurs. 
In  order  to  follow  up  on  questions  raised  by  the  first  questionnaire,  and  to 
facilitate direct UK-Japan comparisons, a second questionnaire was constructed 
in 2000, and sent to just under 400 respondents of the original survey, and just 
under 400 new CEOs.  The additional businesses comprised roughly 200 founded 
before January 1997, biased towards larger businesses and drawn from activities 
under-represented or not included in the previous study, and 200 founded since 
1997, again drawn from the Dun and Bradstreet data base. 
The UK questionnaires included both manufacturing and service businesses.  It 
proved difficult to identify the latter for the second survey in Japan, and the 
decision was made to survey businesses from the original sources, most of which 
were  manufacturers,  but  to  limit  the  businesses  to  those  with  SIC  activities 
comparable to the UK study (‘high tech’).  This was unfortunate if unavoidable 
because it foreclosed exploration of the changing pattern of manufacturing in its 
links with manufacturing services, which was particularly pronounced in the UK.  
New Japanese businesses were added to the survey from Toyo keizai’s Nihon no 
kaisha 78000 (Japanese Companies, 78000), 2001 edition. 
From  respondents  to  the  second  survey  who  indicated  a  willingness  to  be 
interviewed, 25 case CEOs/businesses were selected in each country.  Selection 
criteria  in  the  UK  included  indications  of  innovative  activity,  collaborative 
activity,  geographic  spread  and  sectoral  balance.    Selection  of  the  Japanese 
interviewees was carried out with a view to comparison with the UK cases, while 
ensuring  sufficient  coverage  for  electronics  activities,  which  were  heavily 
represented in Japan.  A relatively high proportion came from the Kyoto and 
Kansai area. Interviews were carried out at the entrepreneur’s business, were 
recorded, and lasted between one hour and two and a half hours.  In some cases 
further clarifications were sought by telephone. 
 
In order to construct an integrated data base from which UK-Japan comparisons 
could  be  meaningfully  carried  out,  further  restrictions  were  imposed.    This 
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involved focusing on businesses with fewer than 200 employees (mainly reducing 
the  Japanese  sample),  engaged  in  manufacturing  (mainly  reducing  the  UK 
sample), and founded since 1945 (mainly reducing the Japanese sample).  The 
result is 113 UK and 223 Japanese manufacturing businesses with fewer than 200 
employees founded since 1945.  Table A-1 shows this process, and gives some 
details of the composition of the data set. 
 